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The Belt and Road initiative: a gargantuan project. Its motivations and goals deal deeply with Chinese political history and ambition. The initiative does not merely affect its proposer, the People’s Republic of China, but also neighbouring and far away countries and cultures, creating a complex geopolitical nexus across the Six Corridors through which goods and commodities and people will flow easily. With its system of pipelines, highways and ports, the dream of a new Silk Road may become real. But, at an astronomical cost: estimated in 1.3 Billion Dollars (Source: CFR Report on BRI). Geopolitically, China has started to enlarge itself towards the West, with this intricate system of infrastructures, to become the next superpower.
As a starting point, the BRI arises as an element of continuity with Chinese politics of the past 20 years, after the deep change occurring after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. It was then that the Red Giant began a gradual opening towards regional fora, more and more assertive of its underlying ideas of international order. As an aftermath of 1997, China attempted the build-up of a regional system functioning as a shield, after the seemingly unjust Austerity policies yielded by the US and the IMF. The PRC developed its narrative of a “fixing power” stressing its non-disruptive approach towards the world order. It operates to fix it, and aims at erecting itself as a regional leader.
These assumptions come in a period in which China political élite attempted a narrative resetting after Mao. This mutation did not consist of a short process, given that Chinese political narrative is still evolving nowadays. However, it may be noticed a gradual abandonment of the Bide and Hide doctrine purported by Deng Xiaoping, and instead, plunge into strategic competition in a strife for the achievement with Jiang Zemin and Chinese PM Zhu Rongji. China poses itself as a rejuvenating force, righteously holding its position of a regional leader due to its glorious past. In fact, the Belt and Road narrative possesses a nostalgic vibe of “Tianxia”, as opposed to the Century of Humiliation’s “Guojia”. The Dragon’s goal would be that of re-asserting itself as a regional, or even worldwide, order-maker. A peaceful and harmonious one. All of this merged with the rising rhetoric of the Chinese Dream (Zhongguo Meng).
The transition towards this strategic undertaking was problematic, under a certain point of view, but beneficial for others. Since the opening of the initiative, officially with Xi Jinping’s speech at the ASEAN Summit in 2013, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment has skyrocketed. As a matter of fact, some country rely on China for a big part of their Foreign Investment Portfolio: this is the case of Kyrgyzstan, which, according to the Council on Foreign Relations BRI Report, is dependent on Chinese investment for the 75% of its industrial assets.
A pattern may be highlighted: State-Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) gained gravity in the Chinese overall GDP, now accounting for nearly 1/3 of the total output. Thus, the increasing weight of these SOE’s would have been highly problematic without a strategy of expansion and cost-reduction. Actually, the domestic market saturation and the danger of excessive production and pile-up of inventories led the government to pursue a diversifying strategy. Therefore, SOE’s were strengthened and reinforced to seek expertise abroad and invest in diversified foreign investments, aiming at gaining materials for the strong infrastructural outlook of the BRI and reducing the risk.
The drawback of this strong governmental support for these Strategic Enterprises may be seen to the other side of the coin: Private Enterprises. The underlying philosophy developed back in the days by PM Zhu of “grasping the large and letting the small go” created Giant companies, but had let the smaller and non-essential one die, rising unemployment. Still today, private enterprises in China will experience a hard time entering influential policy-making, and will probably have no chance of obtaining rents for strategical purposes.
For Asian countries, this may carry ambivalent outcomes. On one hand, Central Asian country are in full need of infrastructural restoration, while China needs resources: the so called “Sovietistan”, the former “Stan’s” once under the USSR, are naturally wealthy in gas and metals. A win-win. Also, the proximity of inner Chinese regions to Central Asia such as Xinjiang will cement the effective control over these are, and make them a pivot in this long-term strategy.
What is more, the presence of multiple autocratic regimes, as Turkmenistan’s North Korea-like leader Berdimuhamedov, will not represent a hurdle to accepting Chinese investment. In fact, Economic Solidarism may not even be envisaged as a concept for business-making, allowing China to avoid those clauses of Human Right protection it may incur in dealing with the European Union.
Problems may surely arise when analysing the other great powers present in Asia and elsewhere.
India has recently shown its aversion to the Chinese presence, given the skirmishes occurred on the northern border. One of the BRI’s corridors interprets Pakistan as a key actor. Given the historical hateful relation between India and Pakistan, both atomic powers, and that the BRI will possibly touch contested regions such as Jammu and Kashmir, the actual realisation of the project without India raising a point is unlikely if not impossible. India will probably feel “surrounded” by China: they would see their presence all around, to the North, the East and the West. In this view, the US may engage India to strengthen itself and become a valid counterweight in the area.
Also, Japan has risen its criticism and suspicion. The China Sea issue has seen a flare up in Chinese vessel movement in the area, clashing with Japan’s strong interests in the region given the ongoing dispute on the Senkaku/Diayou Islands. Moreover, the country may fear a lack of US support, provided their continuous engagement all over the world, making of the China-Japan sea border issue a marginal problem, that is instead vital for the Land of the Rising Sun.
As a last point, thing may spiral into very dangerous situations when the US is concerned. Even though the Bald Eagle is not an Asian power, it can be deemed as such, due to its continuous and consistent presence in the area. Namely, American politics has risen its concerns and fears over the South Asian Region, terrified by a tilt of historical allies, like the Philippines, towards the side of the Chinese. But, US-China relations might become mutually beneficial in the Central Asian area, where they can operate firstly in an Anti-Russian key, and develop investments supported by both parties, considering the American will to build a pipeline from Turkmenistan to India.
In conclusion, the BRI has been analysed for its historical reasons and evolutions, its actual benefices and possible drawbacks, rising contradictions: it is possible that China will become more assertive, violating the pillars of its foreign policy, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the modality through which China establishes its relations with other powers. One scenario would be that of increasing Sinophobia across the South Asian Region, as we have experienced in Myanmar.
Also, the European Union will need to rethink its position vis à vis China and draw a conclusion on the trade-off between Solidarity and structural investments that the Eastern and Southern branches of the EU strongly need.
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